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Nobel Prize in Economics, University of Columbia (EEUU)
It is a real pleasure to be here to talk about a subject which has
received increasing attention in the last week. In some ways, just
as the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the end of Communism, 15
September 2008, marked the end of market fundamentalism, even
though the weaknesses in both systems were evident long before. It
was on 15 September that the American government made clear that
it did not believe that markets by themselves worked and that for the
American economy to continue, it would take massive governmental
interventions of an unprecedented scale, larger in many ways than
had even occurred during the Great Depression. Prior to that date,
the US government had already spent 900 billion dollars, almost a
trillion dollars, in bail-outs. It had increased the national debt by
over five trillion dollars by assuming the debts of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac. These are such large numbers that it is hard to come to
terms with them, but they are the magnitude of what has happened
in the last couple of weeks. But then, the US government made a
commitment that it would take on literally hundreds of billions of
dollars of bad mortgages; most experts think that it will probably be
closer to another trillion dollars.
Thus, we have a massive rethinking of the role of the gov-
ernment and of the market. What I want to do is to look at this
from a broader, more historical perspective and to end with some
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comments about the role of the social economy as we move towards
the construction of a more balanced economy.
1 Market fundamentalism
From a historical point of view, for a quarter of century the
prevailing religion of the West has been market fundamentalism. I
say it is a religion because it was not based on economic science
or historical evidence. It was sold by Thatcher in the UK and by
Reagan in the USA. It made reference to some old ideas in economics,
specifically to Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand, which
is the argument that firms who pursue their self-interest and the
maximization of profits would lead, as if by an invisible hand, to
general societal well-being. I will return to that argument momen-
tarily because, while that is a widely held assumption, Adam Smith
himself was very aware of the limitations of this argument. In fact,
he warned very explicitly of the dangers of unfettered markets; but
those who advocated this kind of market fundamentalism advocated
a particular form of economic organization: profit-maximizing firms
without government regulation.
In a way, this particular set of ideas came under severe
criticism 75 years ago. The Great Depression showed that markets
do not necessarily work well. How could one think markets worked
well, when in Europe and the USA, one out of four people were
involuntarily out of a job? It was also clear that economies do not
necessarily self-correct or self-regulate, at least in the relevant time
frame. Some people said that the markets will eventually adjust,
in the long run, and Keynes’ response to that was, ‘Yes, but in the
long run we are all dead’. Keynesian economics, in a way, rescued
the market. Had it not been for the notion that Keynes put forward,
that with appropriate governmental intervention we could maintain
the economy at full employment, support for market-based economics
may have eroded very quickly. The irony is that Keynes, viewed
widely as a critic of market economics, actually turned out to be its
savior.
Thus, it has come to widely be accepted, both on the left and
on the right, that government macro-interventions are necessary to
sustain the economy. Even conservatives like President Bush in the
USA have argued for the necessity of the use of stimulus packages
to keep the economy going. To be sure, there are a few places in the
world where these ideas are not universally accepted. In the East
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Asia crisis, a decade ago, the IMF resorted to pre-Keynesian ideas
that advocate responding to the crisis by raising taxes and lowering
expenditures. But we all know what happened to these economies as
a result of these IMF policies: the downturns turned into recessions
and recessions into depressions. This provided further evidence of the
validity of Keynesian propositions, that when there is an economic
downturn there is a need for strong government intervention and
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.
In the aftermath of Keynesian economics, a particular set of
ideas were developed, called the neo-classical synthesis. This was
the idea that, once the economy was restored to full employment,
market forces could once again be relied upon to allocate resources.
In a sense, what it said is: ‘Yes, you need government to maintain
macro stability, but if the government did its job then you can rely
on markets for micro economic efficiency’. Now, the interesting thing
about the neo-classical synthesis was that it was not based on any
economic theory. It was put forward as an assertion, actually by my
teacher Paul Samuelson, and was widely accepted around the world.
However, as I argued many years ago, it was far more plausible
that macro-economic problems are the tip of the iceberg of much
more pervasive market failures: markets often don’t work very well.
These macro economic failures are so large that no one could ignore
them.
2 Information economics
When there is an economy with one out of four people unem-
ployed, it is obvious that the economy isn’t working well. But how
do you know when the markets are allocating resources efficiently?
How do you know when they are allocating capital, for instance,
to the areas where the returns are highest? That was a difficult
question. There were some answers we could understand; for in-
stance, we knew markets didn’t work well in the context of pollution
or innovation as they produced too much pollution and too little
innovation. Still, with these fairly well-defined exceptions, there was
a widespread view that markets worked well, once the government
maintained full employment. But that particular perspective was
very strongly undermined by my work and the work of others on the
new paradigm of the economics of information, which recognized that
market participants, often or always, have imperfect information.
There are large asymmetries of information; that is to say, some
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people know more than others. Conventional economics had been
based on the hypotheses of perfect markets, perfect information, and
perfect competition. The hope (and it was just that, a hope) that a
world in which there were not too many imperfections would look
approximately similar to a world in which all the imperfections of
markets and information prevailed.
What my work showed, and the work, as I say, of others in this
new field, was that that hope was wrong. Even small imperfections
of information could have dramatic effects on outcomes, such as inef-
ficient equilibria or monopoly pricing; in other words, the standard
neo-classical model on which so much of modern policy is based
was not robust, and Adam Smith was dramatically wrong. To put it
another way, my work, and that of my colleague Bruce Greenwald
at Columbia University, showed that whenever information was
imperfect, which is always, the reason that the invisible hand so
often seemed invisible was that, in fact, it was not there. The
implication was that there were always government interventions
that could make everyone in society better off, which was, in a
sense, a theoretical repeal of market fundamentalism: the belief that
markets worked on their own and acted with efficiency was simply
not true. It is ironic that just as I was proving these results, the
notion of market fundamentalism became increasingly widespread.
My own work was done in the early seventies, but it was not until
the eighties that Thatcher and Reagan started propagating the ideas
of market fundamentalism, which became widely accepted, just as
economic theory was strongly rejecting these notions.
3 Historical experience
My research showed that one needed to find a balance between
markets, government, and other institutions, including not-for-profits
and cooperatives, and that the successful countries were those that
had found that balance. In short, market fundamentalism, sometimes
referred to as neo-liberalism, was simply wrong. There were a wide
variety of historical experiences which confirmed this perspective. We
can look at it from both the successes and the failures. The last
50 years have actually been very dramatic. We have seen successes
in development beyond anything that we could have imagined, but
we have also seen dramatic failures. The countries that followed the
neo-liberal policies, which focused on market fundamentalism and
the idea that markets worked on their own, by and large failed.
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These were doctrines that were especially widespread within Latin
America.
On the other hand, the region of the world that was most
successful was East Asia. One of the exciting research projects that
I worked on in the late eighties/early nineties was called the East
Asia Miracle, where I tried to study what were the factors that
had contributed to the success of this region. It wasn’t just one
country, it wasn’t just Japan; it was country after country within the
region. They shared a broad economic philosophy based upon a much
greater array of institutional arrangements, with a large role played
by government. An example of the array of institutions includes the
township and village enterprises and cooperatives in China, which
played a critical role in that country’s development in the nineties.
Success in East Asia was clearly related to their not following the
Washington Consensus and instead following a much more balanced
course.
4 The role of government
The same is actually true if you look in more detail at the
USA and Europe. The success of the USA was largely based on the
government assuming a very important role, and if you look sector
by sector you see that role. It had an important role in education,
and actually, until recently, in finance. Before deregulation, the US
government had a very important role in the regulation which helped
create our national banking system. In fact, it was remarkable that
in the midst of our great Civil War in 1863, Abraham Lincoln pushed
through the first banking regulation act. And why did he do it?
Because he saw that after the war we would need a national banking
system, and for it to be successful, it would have to be well regulated.
Lincoln put forward what those regulations were.
The government has also played an important role in providing
finance: it created the modern mortgage but then made the mistake,
partly to help finance the Vietnam War, of privatizing the mortgage
companies. We are now facing the consequences of that flawed
decision. It provided finance for small and medium-size enterprises
through our Small Business Administration, and this too has been
an enormous success in creating new industries. For instance, Fed-
eral Express, which began the overnight mail delivery system, was
financed originally by a small business loan: a small business that
has grown into a very big business.
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The government’s role has been particularly important in tech-
nology and science. In the 19th century, the core of the American
economy was agriculture. Research financed by the US government
and extension services to bring the fruits of that research to ordinary
farmers were the basis of the success of the American economy. The
increased productivity provided the resources with which we were
able to transition into manufacturing. The most important innovation
of the last 25 years has been the Internet, which was financed by
government. The role of government in telecommunications actually
goes much longer back, to the early 19th century, when the first
telegraph line was also financed by the US government. The other
important innovation sector today is biotech, again based on research
financed by the government. Finally, we cannot imagine a modern
economy without infrastructure, without roads, without airports,
which are again areas in which the government plays an important
role.
5 The role of cooperatives
With these remarks, I want to remind us that in the midst of
the view of so many (especially on the right) that the market does
everything, the fact is that if you look at the success of the USA,
it is largely based on the government playing an absolutely critical
role. The government wasn’t the problem; the government was the
solution.
It is also the case that there are important roles for cooper-
atives. Historically, they played an important role in finance and
insurance, and some of the problems we face today are a result of the
conversion of those cooperatives into profit-maximizing enterprises.
But, even today, in agriculture, housing, and other areas, cooperatives
and non-profits play an important role. In fact, I feel very sensitive to
that issue because my own life is surrounded by these institutions: I
work for Columbia University, which is a not-for-profit and the most
successful university in the USA (there is not a single major for-
profit university in the USA), I live in cooperative housing, and my
publisher, WW Norton, is one of the most successful publishers and
is a cooperative.
I want to switch, for a moment, to talk a little bit about the new
perspectives that the understanding of the balance between the role
of the government and the role of the market brings out. There are
three elements that I want to stress. First, one of the flaws of market
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fundamentalism is that it paid no attention to distribution of incomes
or the notion of a good or fair society. But, in fact, as we looked at
what has been associated with strong growth, a fair society with a
better distribution of income can have more sustainable growth, in a
social, political, and environmental sense. The reason for this is that
people are a country’s most important assets, and it is important
to make sure that every person can perform up to their potential.
Excessive inequality can give rise to macro-economic problems. I
would argue that some of the problems that the USA is now facing
are a result of its unbridled inequality, which has increased in recent
years to levels not seen for almost a century.
Finally, the current debacle on the financial market brings
home the fact that there is an important role for government in
making markets work. Markets cannot work by themselves. There
is a need, for instance, for bank regulation. It is easy for institutions
like banks to take people’s money, but the problem is if you get your
money back. It is only in a situation where you have good regulation,
when people can have the confidence that they will get their money
back, that they’re willing to turn over their money.
This is true in many other areas. One of the origins of
food safety regulations in the USA was at the beginning of the
last century. Upton Sinclair wrote a very influential book called
The Jungle, in which he depicted American stockyards, where they
slaughter cattle, so vividly that no one wanted to eat any meat.
The response of the meat packing industry was to approach the
government and say: ‘Please, regulate us so that people will have
confidence once again that our meat is safe to eat’. So, government,
in effect, saved that industry. Today, in a way, we are in the
same situation with respect to finance. The financial markets have
mismanaged themselves, and they are so risky that people have lost
confidence. That is what has happened in September 2008: the lack
of confidence in financial markets led to the pull-out of money, so
that even what had been viewed to be strong corporations could
simply not get finance, and the government had to come in to provide
reassurance.
6 Facing a massive microeconomic failure
In a sense, America is now facing a massive micro-economic
failure on par with the macro-economic failure of the Great
Depression. These problems were predictable and predicted. I don’t
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want to say ‘I told you so’, but I did tell you so. In fact, economists
are generally not very good about predicting the exact time when
things will fall apart. We’re not good at timing – if we were, we
would be rich – but we are good at identifying the fundamental
underlying forces. It was clear that our financial markets weren’t
working or doing what they were supposed to do. Financial markets
are supposed to allocate capital and manage risk. They didn’t allocate
capital well, and they allocated hundreds of billions of dollars to
mortgages beyond people’s ability to pay. They didn’t manage risk;
they created risk. When they innovated, they weren’t creating in-
novations that made our economy more efficient or more productive.
All of this was in part the result of the lack of adequate regulation,
the belief in market fundamentalism by the Fed and the Bush
administration.
One of the ironies and one of the points that has been
brought home very fiercely by these recent events is that we did
have some regulations, but President Reagan had appointed Alan
Greenspan, who did not believe in regulation, as Chairman of the
Federal Reserve Board. If you go back to the mid 1980s, the USA
had a very good central banker, Paul Volker. He managed to bring
down inflation, and you would have thought, given that impressive
record, that he would have been reappointed. Instead, he was fired
by President Reagan because he understood that there was a role
for government in the Fed and for regulation, and Reagan wanted
somebody who did not believe in regulation. He found that person
in Greenspan, and we are now experiencing the consequences of
appointing someone who did not believe in regulation in the modern
economy.
The financial firms were maximizing their profits and pursuing
their greed in the short run. More accurately, the CEOs and other
managers were maximizing their bonuses and income, but this didn’t
lead to the general welfare of our society. Once again, we have seen
a dramatic illustration of the failure of Smiths’ invisible hand. The
pursuit of self interest, profit, old-fashioned greed, did not lead to
societal well-being. Let me make it clear: this is not the first time
that this has happened. In the USA this is the third or fourth
time within the last 20 years. We had the S&L debacle in 1989
and the WorldCom/Enron debacle at the beginning of this decade. In
the late 1990s we misallocated hundreds of billions of dollars to fibre
optics. At one point, 97% of all the fibre optics had seen no light.
Our financial markets have misallocated capital and consistently
mismanaged risk.
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7 Gap between private rewards and social returns
What has also been consistent has been the misalignment of
private rewards and social returns: while they were messing up our
economy, mismanaging risk and misallocating capital, they garnered
for themselves, in recent years, over a third of all corporate profits.
Now, you might have said: ‘If they were getting all those corporate
profits and, as a result of that, made our economy more efficient,
then that’s the price we pay for economic efficiency’. The irony
is we have paid this huge price, but they have mismanaged our
economy.
That leads to deeper questions of ‘What went wrong?’ When
President Bush was asked what went wrong his answer was: ‘We
built too many houses’. While that was true, it wasn’t exactly a deep
analysis. One of the factors contributing to the problem was the
lack of alignment of private rewards and social returns, and that’s
partly related to the incentive systems, which was based on stock
options designed to obfuscate costs. They were designed to make
everybody feel like you could give your CEO something that didn’t
cost anybody anything; you could just print the stock option. The
reality is there is something called the conservation of matter: if you
give the CEO something, it comes out of somebody else’s pocket. This
was an explicit attempt at deception. Interestingly, when I was on
the Council of Economic Advisors, we tried to stop this. We tried to
insist that in their reporting the companies made clear the value of
the stock options and the value of what they were transferring to
their CEOs.
Not surprisingly, those in the financial markets didn’t want
transparency or good information; they wanted obfuscation. Effec-
tively, they wanted to continue, to put it one way, to divert resources
from their investors to themselves. But it was worse than just a
form of theft. It actually led to inefficiency: by focusing on stock
market prices, it encouraged distorted information. It was easier for
the CEOs to give bad information to get their stock prices up than
it was to come up with a good idea, and they became specialists
at how to provide distorted information. Of course, without good
information, markets cannot work well. In addition, the incentives
were designed to encourage excessive risk taking. They got bonuses
in good years, but share holders had to bear the cost of the bad years.
These kinds of short-sighted incentive systems, with asymmetries
between the losses and gains, led to this kind of excessive risk-taking
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in a predictable way and to the gambling that undermined America’s
financial markets.
In short, there is what can only be described as a huge yawning
gap between the private rewards and social returns. While they were
supposed to be rewarded for managing risk and allocating capital,
they mismanaged risk and misallocated capital. Even they could not
appraise the risk of the non-transparent products that they created,
and they realized that they didn’t know their own balance sheet.
As they realized this, they also realized that they didn’t know the
balance sheet of any firm to whom they might lend, and that is why
our financial markets have seized.
At the same time, they failed to create the risk products that
people needed to allow them to manage the risks that they faced.
This is a really important point, as you hear about the wonders of
innovation in America’s financial markets. Their innovations were
really focused on finding new accounting and new procedures by
which they could, first, avoid paying taxes. Those are the innovations
that occurred in the seventies. Then in the eighties and early
nineties, they took these ideas about how to deceive the Federal
government on taxes and figured out how they could simultaneously
deceive their investors. It is a hard task because you want to tell the
government that your income is very low while telling your investors
that your income is very high. That is a conflict, and they figured out
how they could do both by keeping complicated books, reporting low
income to the tax authorities and high income to the investors. What
they finally did is create something that was so complicated that they
even deceived themselves, and that is, of course, the problem we face
today.
They were innovating in ways that involved tax arbitrage,
which is a way of saying ‘getting around taxes’; accounting arbi-
trage, which means ‘circumventing the accounting regulations’; and
regulatory arbitrage, which means ‘getting around the prudential
regulations which were intended to provide the stability of our
economic and financial system’. While they were engaged in what I
would call this destructive innovation, or not constructive innovation,
they were not doing the innovation which they should have or would
have done had they been social enterprises.
A social enterprise would have said: ‘What are the risks that
the people that I work for care about? What are the risks that our
society cares about?’ Take one obvious risk: if you buy a home and
take out a mortgage, you want to be able to manage the risk, to stay
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in your home even if interest rates go up or house prices go down,
the kinds of economic vicissitudes that all market economies face.
However, they didn’t innovate in that way, and the result of that is
that America is having not only an economic problem today but also
a social problem. Three million Americans have already lost their
homes, and with their homes, much of their life savings. We expect
in the next year another two million Americans will lose their homes.
This is a social problem of epic proportions.
Not only did they innovate in ways that were unconstructive,
but they have also consistently resisted innovations which would
have made our economy work better. For instance, when I was on
the Council of Economic Advisors, we noticed that there was no
insurance against inflation, which is one of the risks that people
worry about, and we proposed coming up with a product, called
inflation-indexed bonds, that would help people face inflation. The
US Treasury and Wall Street opposed it. At first, I was puzzled,
because our analysis said that not only would it make people have
a more secure retirement, it would also actually reduce borrowing
costs for the government. It was a win-win situation. But Wall Street
opposed it because they discovered that if people have these products
which protect them against the inflation, they buy them and hold
them until their retirement. They don’t trade, and Wall Street makes
money by transaction costs from these trades. The results of these
failures have been disastrous, and now the economy is going through
a downturn. I estimate that the gap between what our economy will
actually produce and what we could have produced probably will be
over two trillion dollars.
It is important to realize that, while the executives of the
financial companies have done very well, others are bearing the
cost. Not just the home owners who are losing their homes, not just
the workers who are losing their jobs, but the taxpayers who have
been asked to bail out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Bear Stearns.
In a way, now the American taxpayer is the proud owner of the
largest bankrupt insurance company, the largest bankrupt financial
and mortgage companies, and we are about to become the largest
owner of houses in default in the world. Not exactly something, I am
sure, that we would want to otherwise have had and which has been
done in a way that is a model of bad government.
About a decade ago, in the East Asia crisis, the US Treasury,
the IMF, and some of the European countries talked about the
lack of transparency in East Asia. That lack of transparency is no
comparison to the lack of transparency of the US government and
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what it has done in the last few weeks. We still don’t know how much
we may have to pay for the Bear Stearns bailout. These bailouts
have been totally non-transparent, but what we do know is that the
amounts are in the billions or hundreds of billions of dollars. All
of this has occurred while the executives have walked away with
generous severance packages and while the investors and creditors
who enabled all this to happen are being protected. The contrast with
what has happened recently and what was said in East Asia a decade
ago highlights the hypocrisy of what we are seeing.
So far I’ve focused on issues of efficiency, but I want to
highlight that, in fact, efficiency is not everything in life. In other
areas, actually, the standard model works even more poorly.
Markets by themselves often do not produce socially desir-
able outcomes. The obvious example is the great inequality that is
growing in most countries around the world. But another important
aspect is the quality of the workplace, which is important because
people spend a very large fraction of their lifetime at the workplace,
and if the quality of life there is low, it obviously has an adverse
effect on the quality of life overall.
8 Success requires a more balanced economy: a plural
economic system
Success, broadly defined, requires a more balanced economy,
a plural economic system with several pillars to it. There must
be a traditional private sector of the economy, but the two other
pillars have not received the attention which they deserve: the public
sector, and the social cooperative economy, including mutual societies
and not-for-profits. Let me just comment on the third, which I
think has particularly not gotten the attention it deserves in most
economic discourse. These are among the most successful parts of
the American economy.
Some people looking at the American economy observe that
if there is one sector in which we dominate, it is our universities.
If you did a list of the ten leading universities in the world, six
of them would be in America; the American share of that sector
is probably larger than in almost any other industry. Yet, this is
a sector which is totally dominated, as I mentioned before, by not-
for-profits. In fact, in the list of the top universities, there is not a
single one that is for-profit. The history of for-profit universities in
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America has been disastrous. They have occasionally made a profit,
but mostly by exploiting the lack of knowledge of the students. They
were, for instance, very strong in trying to encourage the government
to give student loan programs, but then they would convince students
to enroll in their universities and basically not give them a very
good education. The students would refuse to repay the loans, and
the government would wind up, in effect, picking up the bill. During
the Clinton administration, we changed the rules: universities whose
students refuse to pay back their loans are a sign that the students
felt they didn’t get a quality education to get the jobs that were
promised, and so we won’t lend money to students in these kinds
of schools. These schools put an enormous amount of effort into
lobbying, because they understood the swindle in which they were
engaged. The bottom line is that for-profit universities have been a
disaster in America, and the not-for-profit universities, the colleges
and the state universities, are really the basis of the successful
outcome. These universities are the source of the innovation that
underlies much of the strength of the rest of the American economy.
There is also an important role for not-for-profits, coopera-
tives and mutual societies, in publishing, agriculture, education,
health and housing. Just to mention a few: the dominant butter
company and the dominant orange juice company are successful co-
operatives, and a large fraction of New York housing is cooperatives.
That, of course, highlights the need for research to understand the
reasons for these successes.
I think the first reason for the success of cooperatives is that
democracy, just ordinary democracy, is a value in itself. We all talk
about it, but democracy in the workplace is an important element of
democracy itself. On the one hand, more socially-oriented enterprises
are less inclined to exploit those with whom they interact: their
workers, their customers, and their suppliers. This is especially
important when competition is limited. Some studies, looking at for
instance sugar mills in India, have highlighted that those parts of
India where there have been cooperative sugar mills have done much
better than those in which there have been for-profit sugar mills. The
problems of exploitation are important, not only when competition is
limited but also when there are information asymmetries, in which
one party can exploit the other, or asymmetries in bargaining power.
In market economies these kinds of asymmetries are pervasive.
Greater internal democracy can foster not only a better workplace
but also a more innovative workplace and a more innovative society.
Part of this is based on the notion that with more participation,
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more openness, and more transparent management, there is a better
flow of information. Information is necessary for a well-functioning
economy and well-functioning enterprises.
It is also the case that the kinds of conflict between workers
and management that characterize so many American private sector
enterprises are not conducive to a good flow of information, and,
therefore, are not conducive to innovation. The standard joke in
American enterprises is that the reason we have to pay our CEOs
so much money is because it is so painful for them to have to fire
so many workers all the time, and the reason they have to fire so
many workers is that they have a shortfall of revenue. But the reason
they have a shortfall of revenue is because they’re paying the CEO so
much money. Thus, they have created a vicious circle which doesn’t
lead to more productivity.
You can understand the flaw in the mindset where you say
to a CEO: ‘We have to give you 40 million dollars a year, because
we understand that if we give you 20 million dollars you will not
work hard enough and will only give us half of your attention. That
40 million will give us at least 80 percent of your attention.’ Now you
ask the question: ‘What kind of CEO would only give his full effort if
you pay him with strong incentive pay and these mega-mega-bucks?’
Do you really want that kind of person running the enterprise? In a
sense, what has happened, at least in American enterprises, is that
the CEOs have really undermined the compact between workers and
management. Rather than having a cooperative arrangement, it is
very clear that it is one group trying to extract as much of the value
added and rents of the firm as they can, leaving the workers with
the minimum amount that is left over.
Systems in which there is more participation, more openness,
and more transparent management can also be important in spread-
ing an entrepreneurial culture, where everybody in the firm is part
of the decision-making process, which can increase efficiency in the
enterprise. But there is another important aspect which has recently
received a lot of study, which is job satisfaction. Job satisfaction, as
I mentioned before, is an important part of the quality of life. An
important study showed that a higher quality workplace, including
larger participation in decision-making, leads to greater job satisfac-
tion, even for low-wage jobs. Finally, a higher quality of workplace
improves not only the quality of life but also productivity. As I
noted, participation leads to better flows of information, and better
information leads to better decisions and greater performance from
workers. There are also some fundamental psychological aspects of
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this that have been well studied: better performance increases the
sense of satisfaction, from what I call intrinsic rewards more than
from extrinsic or monitoring rewards. The problem is that the for-
profit sector relies almost exclusively on extrinsic rewards. All this
says that there is the potential of creating a virtuous circle rather
than the vicious circle that I described before.
Now, many of these ideas have played out in the new economy
in a very dramatic way. We’ve seen the success of open source
software, and the contrast between the dynamic aspects of this open
source software and the profit-maximizing software being produced
by some of the monopolists in the USA stands in stark contrast. The
notion of cooperative research that is associated with open-source
software is now beginning to spread to other areas of innovation,
such as green technology: discovering more environmentally-friendly
batteries. One of the reasons for the success of the open-source model
is that it involves greater participation, leading to better motivation
and better outcomes. The consequence of all this is that we need to
encourage a variety of alternative forms of economic organization.
We (and when I say we I mean the USA and most other Western
governments) have focused too long on one particular model, the
profit-maximizing firm, and in particular a variant of that model,
the unfettered market. We have seen that that model does not work,
and it is clear that we need alternative models. We need also to
do more to identify the contribution that these alternative forms of
organization are making to our society, and when I say that, the
contribution is not just a contribution to GDP, but a contribution to
satisfaction.
In my introduction, there was a reference to the work that I am
doing with President Sarkozy. I am trying to devise alternative mea-
sures of GDP and economic performance, as our standard measures
are flawed in many ways. They do not reflect sustainability, either
in an environmental, social or political sense, and they do not reflect
broader sets of values and concerns, including job satisfaction and a
sense of well-being. Developing broader measures is one of the key
objectives of the commission in which I have been involved.
Let me just conclude by congratulating you on the work that
you are doing to try and create a more balanced economy and on
the research that will support that greater balance. I described the
failures of our current model: we have disproportionately allocated
resources, for instance, to housing, beyond people’s ability to pay, but
we have also disproportionately allocated resources to research in the
neo-classical model. In fact, some of this research has been quite bad,
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and in many ways it has contributed to the financial debacle that we
are now facing.
I sometimes jokingly say that one of the reasons that we are
having this financial crisis is that some of our students at Columbia
University listen to only the first third of our lectures. I have lectured
about the virtues of diversification, and they ran down and started
securitizing based on diversification. But in the second third of the
lecture, I tried to explain about correlated risk, systemic risk, and
fat-tail probability distributions. That was a little too complicated
for these business students, and they didn’t want to hear that part
of the lecture. The final part of the lecture was about asymmetries
of information and that securitization creates new asymmetries of
information that will lead to markets working less well. The point is
that a little bit of knowledge can be dangerous.
The real problem is that we have not been doing enough
research to try and understand alternative models or alternative
ways of organizing our society. What we do know at this point is
that the model based on market fundamentalism does not work, and
that is why it’s exactly the right time to begin thinking more about
the kinds of models on which you have been working for so long.
THANK YOU
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